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How not to do industrial policy

Politicians should acknowledge how much we could lose in the new era of suspicion, protectionism and interventionism

Industrial policy is back as a powerful motivator for government intervention. This is true in many parts of the world. It appears to be truer for Xi Jinping’s China than it was under Deng Xiaoping, especially now that it wishes to replace investment in property as its engine of economic growth. But the most striking shift is in the US. Ronald Reagan declared that “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the government, and I’m here to help.” Today, the Biden administration is “helping” enthusiastically. Donald Trump, too, is an interventionist, the difference being that his way of helping is to raise tariffs. Given its historic role as proponent of the open world economy, this shift matters.

The evidence that industrial policy has become more pervasive as both an idea and a practice is clear. “The Return of Industrial Policy in Data”, published by the IMF last January, shows a marked increase in mentions of industrial policy in the business press over the past decade. A paper on “The New Economics of Industrial Policy”, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research and co-authored by Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane and Dani Rodrik, shows a steep increase in industrial policy interventions worldwide, from 228 in 2017 to 1,568 in 2022 — predominantly in high-income countries (probably because they have more fiscal room). This also lets the rest of the world accuse them of hypocrisy. (See charts.)

Economists recognise three valid arguments for such interventions. The first concerns “externalities”, or uncompensated benefits provided by a firm. The most obvious come from what workers and other firms learn from it. There also exist national security and other social externalities. The second argument concerns co-ordination and agglomeration failures: thus, a number of firms may be viable if they start together, but none may be viable if it starts on its own. The final argument concerns the supply of public goods, especially location-specific public goods, such as infrastructure. Note, crucially, that none of these is an argument for protection. As I noted last week, protection is a poor way of achieving such wider social goals.

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马丁•沃尔夫

马丁•沃尔夫(Martin Wolf) 是英国《金融时报》副主编及首席manbetx20客户端下载 评论员。为嘉奖他对财经新闻作出的杰出贡献,沃尔夫于2000年荣获大英帝国勋爵位勋章(CBE)。他是牛津大学纳菲尔德学院客座研究员,并被授予剑桥大学圣体学院和牛津manbetx20客户端下载 政策研究院(Oxonia)院士,同时也是诺丁汉大学特约教授。自1999年和2006年以来,他分别担任达沃斯(Davos)每年一度“世界manbetx20客户端下载 论坛”的特邀评委成员和国际传媒委员会的成员。2006年7月他荣获诺丁汉大学文学博士;在同年12月他又荣获伦敦政治manbetx20客户端下载 学院科学(manbetx20客户端下载 )博士荣誉教授的称号。

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